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Abstract 
If the measure of computational complexity, defined as the computation time required to solve a problem, is independent from the 
computer used, the measure reflects the complexity of the algorithm and the problem instance. If the measure further does not depend on 
the algorithm, it purely reflects the complexity of the problem instance. Focusing on the stable marriage problem, we propose a mapping 
from problem instances to dynamical systems. The computational time required for a dynamical system to reach equilibrium is used to 
measure the complexity. A diagram similar to a phase diagram of dynamical systems is proposed to indicate the structure of stable 
manifolds of dynamical systems. Based on computer simulations, we conjecture that the diagram is qualitatively invariant to the mapping 
and naturally reflects the complexity of the problem instance. The diagram indicates not only that the stable equilibrium corresponds to 
the stable matchings but also that the contour structure corresponds to the discrete structure of the lattice formed by the stable matchings. 
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1. Introduction 
Matching problems and solving are becoming more important not only in game theory as a decision making and 
negotiation process but also in engineering as an autonomous and distributed system design. Mathematically, matching 
problems may be considered as a quantum multi-objective optimization. In a specific matching problem of stable marriage 
problems (SMP)1, the quantum unit may be each agent. When there are many objective functions to be optimized, choosing 
the objective functions and weights to be assigned to them may be a welfare function design problem, rather than merely an 
optimization problem. Also, if there are too many objective functions, it may be more appropriate to consider the problem 
from the other side; that is, if there is no optimized solution for all the agents, then the second best way is to find the 
solution deviation from which would lead to an unfavorable solution for at least one agent; namely, the concept of 
equilibrium (Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative game2) or even stability (stable matching in SMP1, 3). 
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From an engineering viewpoint, freedom of choice may be more positively used in designing adaptive, robust and 
resilient systems. For design purposes, however, we need to investigate matching problems in greater detail including the 
process of stable matchings, or even the dynamics of the process. We have proposed some diagrams for the detailed 
investigation of the SMP with size 34. Using such diagram (a contour map of the simulation steps required), this note further 
investigates asymmetry and symmetry of the diagrams for SMP with sizes 3 and 4. 
The asymmetric and symmetric character of the SMP poses several interesting problems. For example, if we are in a 
complemental world where all marriage is based on the opposite of preferences (based on dislike), then is stable matching 
symmetric or asymmetric or totally different from the original world? The Gale-Shapley algorithm3 or deferred acceptance 
algorithm has an asymmetric nature that changing the proposing side leads to changing the other gender’s optimal matching. 
To what extent does this hold for mixed-gender agents as a proposing side? And for stable matchings between man-optimal 
and woman-optimal matchings, does there exist a set of agents whose optimality leads to stable matchings? 
Section 2 briefly explains the stable marriage problem as a matching problem and classification of the size 3 SMP. 
Section 3 presents several diagrams including classes encompassing all the instances with size 3 and some instances of size 
4. Section 4 discusses the asymmetric character of the SMP based on the visual symmetry of the diagrams. 
 
Nomenclature 
SMP stable marriage problem 
SRM self-recognition model 
2. Mapping matching problems to dynamical models 
2.1. Matching problems 
The stable marriage problem (SMP)1, 3, 5, 6 assumes N women {wi: i = 1…N} and N men {mi: i = 1…N}, each of whom 
has a strict (without tie) ordered preference (rank) for the opposite sex. The SMP seeks complete matching between women 
and men without being blocked. 
The preference of each agent is expressed by a preference matrix {aij} where the element aij in the ith row and jth column 
is defined to be R(mi, wj)/R(wj, mi) where R(mi, wj) is the rank of mi to wj. In Table 1, for example, a13 = R(m1, w3)/R(w3, m1) 
= 3/2 indicates that the man m1 likes the woman w3 third (last) while the woman w3 likes the man m1 second-best. 
2.2. Classification of preference structure of stable marriage problem 
In this note, we focus on the preference structure of the stable marriage problem with sizes 3 and 4. The structure of the 
size 3 SMP may be classified into six classes7 with a graph homomorphism in the reduced stable marriage graph8 as shown 
in Fig. 1. As observed in the figures, classes 1 and 2 have a decomposable preference structure, while other classes are 
indecomposable. Instances of each class are shown by the preference matrices in Tables 1-6. 
 
Fig. 1.7 Classification of size 3 SMP by a graph homomorphism in the 
reduced stable marriage graph8. Numbers in small boxes indicate the class 
of SMP. 㻌
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2.3. Example of mapped dynamical model 
Instances of the SMP can be mapped to many dynamical models such as self-recognition models (or mutual recognition 
networks)9 and generalized Lotka-Volterra models10. In the mapping, a pair of a man and a woman is expressed as a time 
dependent variable varying from 0 (full exclusion of the pair from a matching) to 1 (full inclusion of the pair in a matching). 
This note focuses on the mapping to the modified self-recognition model. The self-recognition model uses the time 
dependent variables ri(t) and their normalized ones Ri(t): 
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The parameter Tij = 1 (−1) when the variable Ri is designed to stimulate (inhibit) Rj, and Tji = 0 otherwise (no 
interactions). The symbol N indicates the size of the SMP instance. Inhibitions are used to exclude violations of the 
assumptions in the SRM such as one man and one woman must be paired, and to exclude unstable matchings by inhibiting 
variables corresponding to blocking pairs.  
The self-recognizing model can be visually expressed as a network. Nodes represent all the possible pairs of the SMP 
instance. The dynamical system is designed to converge on the state where the credibility of all the nodes consisting of 
stable matching will be 1, and 0 otherwise. Arcs are drawn between all the pairs (hence a complete graph). The arcs between 
nodes in the same column or the same row have a negative sign because the pairs are exclusive in one matching. The arcs to 
and from the blocking pair also have a negative sign, for the pair should be blocked out from the stable matching. The other 
arcs have a positive sign. 
In the self-recognizing model, initial values of credibility must be set to each node. In the simulation model, we set the 
initial values based on the following: 
1. The initial values should reflect the preference of each agent so that the pair with higher preference should survive 
in the selection process; 
2. The initial values should include a control parameter for the bias preference of the set of agents. 
The first criterion promotes the mutually-preferring pair to remain as a stable matching; the second criterion controls the 
stable matching toward man-optimal (woman-pessimal), woman-optimal (man-pessimal) matching or in the middle between. 
In the following,  R(mi,wj)(0) indicates the initial value of the credibility corresponding to a pair (mi,wj). Women’s priority 
PRI(W) (men’s priority PRI(M)) is the control parameter ranging [0,1] (or 0 to 100%  as in Fig. 2 (b)) to bias in favor of the 
woman (man). 
 
 
 
3. Diagrams 
3.1. Definitions and calculations for diagrams 
After an instance of the SMP is mapped to a dynamical system, we can numerically simulate the dynamical system. We 
can measure the time steps required to reach an attractor for any positive combination of initial values: that is, the initial 
credibility of variables representing all the combinations of possible pairs. If we continuously change the initial value, then 
we encounter the point where very long time steps required. The point is on the border between the basins of two attractors. 
In the phase space of the dynamical model, attractors correspond to stable matchings and a basin of the attractor to initial 
settings from which the decision will be attracted to the stable matching corresponding to the attractor. However, there can 
be cases in which some attractors do not correspond to any stable matching, depending on the mapping and the dynamical 
model. Also, a border between basins specifies the initial values from which a decision on any matching is impossible. 
Fig. 2 (a) shows a diagram in which the horizontal axis indicates the women’s priority PRI(W) (men’s priority PRI(M)=1-
PRI(W)) to the left (right), and the vertical axis indicates the time steps required to reach an attractor when the initial value 
specified by the priorities on the horizontal axis. Three valleys can be observed where the left-most one corresponds to the 
woman-optimal matching, the right-most one to the man-optimal matching, and the middle one to the other stable matching. 
2
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In 2D diagrams where the vertical axis is used for the number of simulation steps required to reach an attractor and the 
horizontal axis for indicating a woman’s (man’s) priority to the left (right), we can observe that valleys correspond to the 
attractors. In such 2D diagrams, we can observe not only woman-optimal (man-optimal) matching at the left-most valley 
(right-most valley) but also other stable matchings between them (Fig. 2 (a)). 
In 3D diagrams, the horizontal axis is used to indicate men’s priority; the vertical axis women’s priority and the height of 
the time steps required to reach an attractor (Fig. 2 (c)). We can draw a 2D contour map where the contour lines are color 
graded (Fig. 2 (b)). Fig. 2 (a) is a cross-sectional diagram of Fig. 2 (b) through the line from the top-left corner down to the 
bottom-right corner. The rest of the discussion uses this 2D contour map.  
 
3.2. Size 3 stable marriage problems 
Instances of size 3 stable marriage problems can be classified into six classes based on the number of stable matchings 
and the pairing structure of stable matchings. Tables 1 to 6 indicate the preference matrices of instances from each class 
classified in Fig. 1. Fig. 3 shows the diagram of each class.  
Table 1 Class 1: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference  Table 2 Class 2: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference 
 w1 w2 w3   w1 w2 w3 
m1 1/1 2/2 3/2  m1 1/1 2/3 3/3 
m2 3/2 1/1 2/3  m2 3/2 1/2 2/1 
m3 2/3 3/3 1/1  m3 3/3 2/1 1/2 
 
Table 3 Class 3: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference  Table 4 Class 4: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference 
 w1 w2 w3   w1 w2 w3 
m1 1/2 2/1 3/3  m1 2/1 3/3 1/3 
m2 3/3 1/2 2/1  m2 1/2 3/1 2/2 
m3 2/1 3/3 1/2  m3 3/3 1/2 2/1 
 
Table 5 Class 5: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference  Table 6 Class 6: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference 
 w1 w2 w3   w1 w2 w3 
m1 1/2 2/2 3/1  m1 2/2 1/3 3/1 
m2 3/1 1/3 2/2  m2 1/3 3/1 2/2 
m3 3/3 2/1 1/3  m3 3/1 2/2 1/3 
(a)                                                                     (b)                                                                        (c) 
Fig. 2. Diagrams showing the number of simulation steps required to reach attractors. The required number of time steps is 
indicated by height in 2D (a) on the vertical axis and initial value setting on the horizontal axis ranging from 0 (woman-
optimal) to 1 (man-optimal); by color gradation in 2D (b) with initial value setting on the horizontal (vertical) axis for man’s 
(woman’s) priority ranging from 0 to 100 as man-optimal (woman-optimal); and in 3D with color gradation (c). Three 
attractors (valleys) as well as two border lines between attractors (hills) can be observed. Note that decision-making becomes 
more difficult closer to the origin (point of no information in the initial value).  
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3.3. Size 4 stable marriage problems 
Instances of the size 4 SMP are too big to exhaustively enumerate here; we investigate three instances of size 4 SMP 
(Tables 7-9) including one Latin SMP (Table 9) to observe the symmetry and asymmetry exhibited by the diagrams. Latin 
SMP11 is an SMP where at each element aij, which is defined to be R(mi, wj)/R(wj, mi),  of a preference matrix {aij}, R(mi, 
wj) + R(wj, mi) = N + 1 must hold where N is the size of the SMP. Fig. 4 (a), (b) and (c) are diagrams of the instances of 
Tables 7, 8 and 9, respectively. 
 
Table 7 SMP 1: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference  Table 8 SMP 2: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference 
 w1 w2 w3 w4   m1 m2 m3 m4 
M1 3/1 1/4 2/3 4/4  w1 1/3 3/2 2/4 4/1 
M2 2/2 1/3 3/1 4/3  w2 4/1 1/3 3/2 2/4 
M3 4/4 3/1 2/4 1/2  w3 2/4 4/1 1/3 3/2 
M4 1/3 2/2 4/2 3/1  w4 3/2 2/4 4/1 1/3 
 
Table 9 Latin SMP: Man’s Preference/Woman’s Preference 
 w1 w2 w3 w4 
m1 1/4 2/3 3/2 4/1 
m2 4/1 1/4 2/3 3/2 
m3 3/2 4/1 1/4 2/3 
m4 2/3 3/2 4/1 1/4 
 
(d)    Class 4                                                     (e) Class 5                                                          (f)   Class 6 
Fig. 3. Diagrams showing the number of simulation steps required to reach attractors. The required number of time steps is 
indicated by color gradation in 2D with initial value setting on the horizontal (vertical) axis for man’s (woman’s) priority 
ranging from 0 to 100 as man-optimal (woman-optimal). Diagrams of an instance of each class indicated by the preference 
table (Tables 1-6) are drawn.  
(a)   Class 1                                                       (b)   Class 2                                                     (c)  Class 3 
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4. Asymmetry in diagrams 
4.1. Exchange-symmetry and asymmetry 
Diagrams allow us to observe several discrete symmetries or exchange symmetries as a more visually obvious continuous 
map. Exchanging man and woman amounts to exchanging the vertical axis (man’s priority) with the horizontal axis 
(woman’s priority), hence resulting in reflecting the symmetrical map through the line from the bottom-left corner (origin of 
the coordinate axes) to the top-right corner. In Fig. 4, (a) and (b) do not exhibit the gender exchange symmetry, while (c) 
has the symmetry due to the definition of Latin SMP. 
In general, reversing the preference would result in a different preference structure as observed in Fig. 4 (a)-(a’) and (b)-
(b’). When the original preference exhibits symmetry as in the case of Fig. 4 (c), making the preference order completely for 
both men and women has the same effect as exchanging man and woman, as observed in Fig. 4 (c)-(c’). For the Latin SMP 
which already exhibits the man-woman exchange symmetry by the definition of Latin, the reverse operation of the 
preference will result in a diagram invariant from the original diagram. 
4.2. Woman-optimal, man-optimal and between 
Since setting the initial credibility of pairs in favor of the woman leads to woman’s optimal matching, we naturally 
expect that even for a specific subset of agents with mixed gender, setting the initial credibility of pairs in favor of specific 
members would lead to stable matching (if it exists) realizing the members’ optimality. To focus on the optimality or 
happiest matching for a subset of agents with mixed gender (called mixed agents), we consider a diagram in which the 
(a)   Size 4 SMP1                                             (b)   Size 4 SMP2                                           (c)  Size 4 Latin SMP 
(a’) Preference Reversed from (a)                      (b’) Preference Reversed from (b)                   (c’) Preference Reversed from (c) 
Fig. 4.Diagrams showing the number of simulation steps required to reach attractors. The required number of time steps is indicated by color 
gradation in 2D. (a) and (b) are diagrams of two instances of size 4 SMP indicated by the preference tables: Table 7 and Table 8, 
respectively; (c) is the diagram of an instance of size 4 Latin SMP indicated by the preference table: Table 9.  (a’), (b’) and (c’) are diagrams 
when the preference order is reversed for (a), (b) and (c), respectively.  
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vertical axis indicates women’s (men’s) priority in the downward direction (up), and the horizontal axis indicates the mixed 
agents’ (the remaining agents) priority in the right direction (the left). Initial values for the mixed agents can be set similarly 
to those specified by women’s and men’s priority. 
When the SMP instance has two stable matchings, the border line between the basins of attractors crosses the diagram 
horizontally. Fig. 5 (a) shows a diagram with the mixed agents m1w2m3 featured for an instance of the class 2 of size 3 
SMP (which has two stable matchings). 
When the size 3 SMP instance has three stable matchings, two border lines cross the diagram with roughly two patterns: 
the two border lines open to the right (Fig. 5 (b)), and are almost parallel (Fig. 5 (c)). These patterns can indicate whether 
the centered attractor attains the optimal matching for the mixed agents in the former case (Fig. 5 (b)); and the centered 
attractor attains the optimal matching for the members selected from the mixed agents and the remaining agents with a 
balance (Fig. 5 (c)). 
 
 
4.3. Discrete structure and continuous map 
By mapping the SMP to dynamical models, the correspondence between stable matchings in the SMP and attractors in 
the dynamical models has been studied. Since the mapping has not yet been examined exhaustively, we do not yet know 
whether every stable matching has its counterpart of attractors, nor whether distinct stable matchings are mapped to distinct 
attractors. However, we can show that there can be invariant sets that do not have corresponding stable matchings. Our 
mapping scheme indicates that symmetric structures in the preference matrix will be reflected on the symmetric structures 
of the dynamical models mapped. Thus, a symmetric structure such as a Latin SMP11 will be mapped to the dynamical 
model exhibiting symmetric structure where variables cannot be distinguished. Hence, the model with an equal initial value 
assigned to all the variables will evolve to the equal value of all the variables afterward, forming an invariant set consisting 
of points with equal values of variables. In the SRM, the origin where all the variables are 0 is a fixed point. 
This fact indicates that the algorithms for solving the SMP such as the Gale-Shapley (GS) algorithm3 involve asymmetry 
in the process of solving. The GS algorithm, for example, has the temporal asymmetry (asynchronous) that some pairing 
must be formed in the first place even though all the members are under the symmetric situation as far as their own 
preference and others’ preferences are concerned. To reflect such asymmetry in the process of problem-solving in the 
trajectory of dynamical models, initial values for the dynamical model must be asymmetric, avoiding the fixed points and 
the invariant set mentioned above. 
By appropriately selecting the mixed agents, a discrete diagram of lattice can be mapped to a continuous diagram. Fig. 6 
shows both lattice diagram (left) and the contour map (right) of the time steps required to reach attractors. 
 
(a)   Class 2 m1w2m3 featured                       (b) Class 5 m1m2w2 featured                       (c) Class 5 m1m3w3 featured 
Fig. 5. Diagrams showing the number of simulation steps required to reach attractors. The required number of time steps is indicated 
by color gradation in 2D. The initial value setting on the vertical axis ranges from 0 (woman-optimal) to 100 (man-optimal); and on 
the horizontal axis from 0 (the mixed agents m1m3w3-pessimal) to 100 (the mixed agents m1m3w3-optimal).  
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5. Conclusion 
By corresponding possible pairs to the nodes of a dynamical network and the preference structure to the initial values of 
the dynamical network, we mapped the stable marriage problem (SMP) to dynamical systems. The mapping induces a 
mapping from stable matchings of the SMP to attractors of the dynamical systems. The structure of stable matchings 
expressed by a discrete structure of lattice is now expressed as a continuous contour map similar to a phase diagram of the 
dynamical systems. The diagram allows us to observe the following: 
 
z Not only two extreme stable matchings (man-optimal and woman-optimal) but also other matchings are placed in a 
continuous map. 
z Similarly to obtaining two extreme matchings by setting the active side of agents (as in the Gale-Shapley algorithm), 
there can be a mixed subset of men and women whose activation leads to stable matching which makes the mixed 
agents optimal (happy). 
z The diagram reveals the difficulty (ease) of attaining a specific stable matching starting from a specific continuous or 
discrete configuration (initial values). 
z A diagram can exhibit several (discrete or continuous) symmetries. 
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